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I
INTRODUCTION
Recent legal research on statutory interpretation has raised questions about
the usefulness of legislative history-committee reports, hearings, floor
debates-in assisting judges in interpreting the intent of legislation. Many legal
scholars have expressed skepticism on the grounds that majority rule decision-
making is chaotic (the Arrow Impossibility Theorem) and that members of the
legislature may shirk their responsibilities or engage in strategic misrepresenta-
tion of their preferences and expectations. This article applies the economics of
information and organization to examine the structure of the legislative process
in order to identify how legislators solve the problem of instability of majority
rule and to identify the activities in which members have an incentive to reveal
truthfully their agreements about the intended effects of a statute, as contrasted
to activities in which lawmakers may engage in "cheap talk" without fear of
negative consequences. From this analysis, we identify aspects of the legislative
history that are more reliably informative about the intent of the majority
coalition that enacted a statute. We then apply these results to evaluate the
judicial interpretations of two important environmental statutes, the Clean Air
Act of 1970 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. We find that
the interpretation of the former act relied primarily on cheap talk, while the
interpretation of the latter act relied on more trustworthy, consequential actions
by pivotal members of the enacting coalition.
During the 1980s, legal scholarship on principles for interpreting statutes
experienced a renaissance, producing a prodigious and far-ranging literature. For
the most part, this work is oriented toward identifying interpretive principles
that, in some sense, produce "good" public policy or that are otherwise
normatively compelling. The motivation for this work was the development of
influential new theories in other disciplines that challenged the intellectual
foundations of previous ideas about statutory interpretation. One such
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development was the post-structuralist revolution in literary criticism, based upon
twentieth-century developments in the philosophy of language. The new critical
theory challenged the notion that in any meaningful sense a reader can uncover
the intention of an author. The other development was the appearance of
modem positive theories of politics. These models focused on two rather
pessimistic views of policymaking: that government was controlled by organized
special interests who capture the coercive power of government to feather their
own nests, and that democracy was fundamentally unpredictable and chaotic.
Both views challenged the normative significance of the policies emanating from
democratic political processes.
In our view, the recent literature on interpretation can usefully be separated
into three categories.' The first, associated with critical legal theorists, 2 amounts
to a counsel of despair. As with the Queen of Hearts, words mean precisely
what the person in authority says they mean, without constraints derived from
interpretive principles. The second, sometimes referred to as the "new
textualism," is associated with the strict textualists3 but has its roots in the
nineteenth-century presumption that common law and private arrangements have
greater claims to legitimacy than statutory law. This view calls for narrow and
limited readings of statutes. The essential message is that when statutory
language is unclear, conflicting, or incomplete, the statute does not apply.
The third category, comprising the most recent articles on interpretation,
seeks to develop interpretive principles that avoid the pitfalls identified by
critical and positive political theories In general, this work assumes that the
pathologies of politics and the indeterminacy of language are important, but not
so pervasive that they require abandonment of the interpretive project. In
simplified, stylized terms, when someone is faced with applying a statute, this
literature recommends an interpretive agenda of roughly the following form:
5
1. This categorization of the literature was suggested to us by William Eskridge.
2. See, e.g., STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrIcS (1975).
3. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
4. Recent articles in this category include William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407 (1989).
Eskridge further divides this group into "original intentionalists," such as RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of the Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985); and
"dynamicists," including GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
Eskridge & Frickey, supra; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
220 (1988).
5. As a practical matter, these steps do not form a temporal sequence, but instead a logical one.
As Posner has observed, the natural starting place for a judge who seeks to interpret a statute is usually
previous judicial interpretations, typically as cited in the briefs submitted by the parties to a case. See
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
800, 808 (1983). We are interested in the logical sequence of the first judicial interpretation of new
statutory language.
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1. Read the text; if it is not clear, then proceed to step two.
2. Consider the overall structure and purpose of the statute as written and,
where relevant, other related statutes; if it is still not clear, then proceed to step
three.
3 . Consult the legislative history to see if in the course of the legislative
process, elected political officials left a record about how ambiguities should be
resolved, and proceed to step four.
4. Based on the information collected in the previous steps, ascertain
whether the statutory provision in question reflects politically legitimate values
or the pathologies of representative democracy; if the statute remains
ambiguous, or if it reflects a democratic pathology, then proceed to step five.
5. Invoke normative principles (varying among the authors) to determine
whether the statute should be applied, and if so, how to resolve the ambiguities
and compensate for the pathologies.
Of course, scholars differ in the extent to which they believe that
intentionalism, even through "imaginative reconstruction, ' can solve interpre-
tive problems. Nevertheless, all work in the third category includes some role
for going beyond the specific passage of the text to ascertain its purpose as
understood by those who created it. However, the legal literature to date lacks
an approach to the broader methods of statutory interpretation that is fully
compatible with how legislation is actually created and how elected officials
oversee the implementation of policy by agencies and courts. As Richard A.
Posner has observed, methods of statutory interpretation "are not guided by an
overall theory of legislation, and most academic lawyers, like most judges and
practicing lawyers, would consider it otiose, impractical and pretentious to try to
develop one."7
In this article, we propose a method for interpreting legislation that is
grounded in a positive theory of the behavior of legislators and the president!
This method can help judges and other interested observers make use of the
varied and often contradictory statements and actions of legislators and the
president during the legislative process to infer the policy agreement that is
embodied in a statute.
Our interpretive method overlaps the legal scholarship that instructs the court
to ascertain as accurately as possible the "original intent" of legislation, by which
is meant the actual agreement about policy among those enacting a statute.9 Our
6. POSNER, supra note 4, at 287.
7. Posner, supra note 5, at 800.
8. For a discussion of positive political theory, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Forewarvk
Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992).
9. For examples of this standard approach to statutory interpretation, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory
Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 217 (1992). Of course, not only judges
will be interested in interpretive principles of this form. If judges attempt to interpret statutes according
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approach differs from this literature in that our focus on original intent need not
be based on a normative theory of how courts ought to behave.10 If a judge or
bureaucrat believes that the argument for implementing policy in the manner
intended by those who created a statute is normatively compelling in at least
some cases, then an interpretive method that uncovers this intention is useful.
But regardless of the motives of those who implement and enforce policy,
bureaucrats, judges, and citizens who are directly affected by a statute need to
have a reasonably accurate method of ascertaining the policy intent of a statute
in order to respond rationally to it, even if this response is something other than
faithful fealty to that original intent." If judges, bureaucrats, and lawmakers all
seek to pursue their own antagonistic policy objectives, each group needs to take
the others into account to accomplish its purposes.
For example, a court must obtain bureaucratic compliance with its interpreta-
tions of the law if its policy directives are to be implemented, and it must obtain
legislative compliance if the bureaucracy is to retain its policy mandate and is to
be given sufficient resources to carry out the court's wishes.12 Moreover, the
authority of a court to interpret statutory intent and enforce the law depends
upon powers and resources given to it by statute. Thus, in pursuing its own
policy objectives, a court is constrained to act within limits that are acceptable
to other political actors. Consequently, to shape policy as closely as possible to
its own preferences, a court must take into account the nature of the agreement
that lawmakers thought that they were making (and thought the agencies and
courts would implement) when enacting legislation. Hence, the normative issue
concerning how statutes ought to be interpreted, assuming that their objective
is to spell out faithfully a legislative bargain, closely parallels the positive theory
of the adoption of interpretive canons.
In a previous article, 3 we argued that the positive political theory of statutory
enactment provides significant insights about the meaning of a legislative bargain
among members of the coalition enacting a statute. That article focused on using
to the original intentions of lawmakers, agencies and citizens must engage in a similar exercise if their
actions are to be upheld when challenged in the courts. For scholars and judges who advocate deference
to agencies in interpreting statutes, the interpretive canons in the legal literature can be reread as
normatively compelling recommendations to agencies. And, for scholars who propose that judges first
ascertain whether a statute serves general or special interests, and then apply broad interpretive canons
to the former but narrow readings to the latter, the problem of ascertaining legislative intent initially
takes a somewhat different, but conceptually similar approach: Positive theory can be used to determine
whether a statute is intended to serve a narrow, private interest in the same way that it can be used to
infer the nature of the policy agreement.
10. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); McNollgast, The Theory of Interpretive Canon and Legislative Behavior, 12
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 235-38 (1992); Rodriguez, supra note 9.
11. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523
(1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992); Rodriguez, supra note 9.
12. On this line of reasoning, see MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS: JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).
13. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80
GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).
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positive theory to identify the members of an enacting legislative coalition and,
in particular, the political actors who were pivotal in that their preferences had
to be taken into account in order for a legislative agreement to be made. In this
article, we extend our argument by incorporating the principles of the economics
of information-in particular, signaling behavior by political actors. We develop
principles for identifying the actions and statements by a legislator and the
president that convey meaningful signals about actual preferences.
As extended, our approach to ascertaining statutory intent deals with two
issues: first, identifying the pivotal political actors who formed a majority
coalition in enacting a bill, and second, detecting the actions that reveal their
policy preferences. Both are essential to discovering the nature of the agreement
that the members of the coalition thought they were making. In particular,
ascertaining legislative intent requires separating the meaningless actions (or
signals) of participants in the legislative process from the consequential signals
that are likely to reveal information about the coalition's intentions.
We use the term "pivotal" in a broader sense than simply the "swing" voters
in Congress who must be induced to vote for a bill if it is to be enacted. As we
use the term, anyone who occupies a "veto gate" in the institutional structure of
legislative decisionmaking is also pivotal. Think of the legislative process as a
decision tree, in which different members of the legislature are assigned different
responsibilities at various decision nodes. A pivotal member is one whose action
at a particular node can determine which branch of the tree the process will
subsequently follow. For example, the rules of Congress permit the chair of a
subcommittee that has jurisdiction over a legislative proposal unilaterally to
decide not to allow it to be considered, or to insist that it contain certain
provisions if it is to be reported out of committee. Such actions may or may not
change the ultimate outcome of the legislative process, for decisions of
committee chairs can be overturned. In general, the actions of pivotal members
at early or intermediate stages of the process can always be overturned by
subsequent actions; however, overturning the decision of a pivotal actor is costly.
The ability to impose costs on subsequent decisionmakers who wish to reverse
a previous decision gives early-stage pivotal actors influence over the final
legislative outcome. The greater the costs that subsequent players must bear to
overcome an earlier action, the more influential the player who takes that action
will be.14
Signaling is, of course, a major preoccupation of politicians. They frequently
make speeches, issue press releases, publish policy reports and studies, grant
interviews, write constituents, and propose bills. Those who are legislators also
14. In the positive theory of majority-rule voting, pivotal players arise from the distribution of
preferences. For example, if the policy space is confined to a single dimension and the agenda is limited
to binary choices, the member whose preferences are at the median of the distribution will be pivotal
in that all winning coalitions must contain this member. Of course, a political actor who occupies a veto
gate is pivotal in this sense, albeit in a trivial way, in that a veto player can be regarded as the median
voter in a single-member constituency.
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cast votes and make procedural motions during the consideration of a bill.
Probably the most persuasive argument against using the legislative history in
statutory interpretation is that politicians sometimes misrepresent their actual
policy preferences. Hence, a theory of statutory interpretation that makes use
of legislative history bears the burden of proving that some signals are
reasonably reliable indicators of what lawmakers thought they were doing when
enacting legislation. To discover the nature of the agreement that emerges from
a legislative process, one must develop criteria for determining which of these
signals are meaningful.
In general, an observer (a jurist) who is uninformed (for example, about
legislative intent) can learn from a signal of an informed party (a legislator) in
either of two circumstances. First, the observer can learn whether the informed
party bore some cost to communicate the signal. Although the content of the
signal may be meaningless to the observer, the fact that the informed party bore
a cost to communicate it nonetheless tells the observer that the informed party
believed that the benefit of communicating would likely outweigh the cost
incurred to do so. Second, if the informed party can be punished for sending
false signals, the observer can conclude that some lies are unprofitable for the
informed party (those for which the expected benefit for lying is less than the
expected penalty). This reasoning allows the observer to conclude that certain
signals are more likely to reflect the truth than are others.
We use the general principles of signaling behavior to identify the actions and
statements in a legislative history that can provide an outside observer with
information about the interests and expectations of the parties to an agreement
and, thereby, about the intent of a statute. Actions taken at key nodes in the
congressional process-for example, votes by members of a committee to
recommend a bill to the floor-are costly in terms of effort and foregone
opportunities. In other cases, such as majority reports of committees, false or
misleading signals subject their makers to penalties.
In the remainder of this article we present in detail the argument sketched
above and apply our method of statutory interpretation to two important cases.
In part II we argue that relevant officials-lawmakers, bureaucrats, and
judges-have an interest in developing a mutually accepted system of interpret-
ing statutes that reveals, as closely as possible, the intent of the coalition within
the House and Senate (most often together with the president) that enacted the
statute. Part III uses the contemporary theory of legislative decisions, based on
the effects of the structure and process of the development of legislation, to
identify the pivotal actors in creating statutes and to provide an explanation for
why the concept of statutory intent by the enacting coalition is meaningful,
despite the well-known pathologies of majority-rule representative democracy.
Part IV makes use of the economics of information to develop a model of
learning from signals in the legislative process. Part V applies the model of
statutory interpretation developed in the previous two sections to a well-known,
controversial case: Judge Skelly Wright's 1971 circuit court decision in Calvert
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Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission.15
This decision clarified the applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 ("NEPA") to the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC"). We compare
this decision to the outcome of Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus in 1972, which we
have analyzed elsewhere,1 6 wherein Judge John H. Pratt ruled that the Clean
Air Act of 1970 required that the Environmental Protection Agency adopt the
"Prevention of Significant Deterioration" policy in areas with pristine air
quality.1 7 Both decisions came down firmly in favor of interpretations favored
by environmentalists; however, our reading of the two decisions shows that only
the Calvert Cliffs decision was based on a clearly valid reading of the legislative
history. Part VI contains our conclusions.
II
PURPOSES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The fundamental assumption of our approach, not uncommon in the
literature, is that legislation shares many characteristics with contracts.'" Both
formalize bargains among actors with diverse and partially conflicting interests.
Because agreements that provide for every contingency are costly, if not
impossible, to negotiate, contracts typically do not cover every potentially
relevant issue and so leave unresolved gaps. As A. Mitchell Polinsky writes,
[c]ontract law can be viewed as filling in these "gaps" in the con-
tract-attempting to reproduce what the parties would have agreed to if they
could have costlessly planned for the event initially. Since the parties would
have included contract terms that maximize their joint benefits net of their joint
costs-both parties can thereby be made better off ... 19
If the analogy between legislation and contracts is extended to matters of
legal interpretation, the role of the courts is to fill in the gaps in legislation by
interpreting the intentions of the law's enacting coalition. To determine
legislative intent, courts have relied on a wide range of evidence about the
parties involved, including information about their preferences, intentions, and
expectations at the time of the agreement and data about the relevant
constituencies affected by the legislation.
Of particular importance to the courts has been the paper trail of commen-
tary and debate in the legislative record or legislative history. Within the
legislative record, however, judges and scholars have often found widely
15. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
17. 334 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
18. See Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REV. 667 (1991);
Gillian Hadfield, Incomplete Contracts and Statutes, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 257 (1992).
19. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (1989); see also
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS (1988).
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divergent interpretations of the same provision of a law. One key challenge for
an interpretive method is determining how to ascertain which of these indicators
actually reveals the bargain reached by the enacting coalition.
A second problem of statutory interpretation is how to apply legislation when
circumstances arise that were not explicitly taken into account in the legislation.
Scholars of statutory interpretation have long recognized that ambiguity about
future contingencies is a problem for all legislation.' Again, applying the
contract analogy, an interpretive system that is based on the original agreement
of the parties would seek to ascertain whether the parties would have wanted the
new circumstance to be covered by their bargain, and if so, how the policy
should be extended to accommodate it.
We approach these interpretive problems by examining the events in the
legislative history in which the bargains among pivotal lawmakers are made. The
Constitution and the standing rules of the House and Senate define the
decisionmaking stages in the legislative process. Positive political theory
identifies which actions by which actors both influence and reveal the bargains
that are being struck.
A. Positive Political Theory and Legislative Intent
Positive political theory ("PPT") has been concerned with two central issues:
collective action and delegation. The collective action problem concerns how
governing institutions, populated by representatives elected under differing
electoral structures and holding differing policy objectives, make durable bargains
about public policy.2" A continuing theme of much of the theoretical literature
on collective action has been the instability of collective choice in majority-rule
institutions such as legislatures. Reaching a legislative agreement is made all the
more difficult in politics in the U.S. by a constitutional structure that requires
enacting coalitions to encompass majorities in both houses of Congress and to
gain the support of the White House. Moreover, the durability of agreements,
once made, is uncertain because the entire coalition that enacts a statute is
unlikely to remain in office for more than a few months after the statute is
passed.
The delegation problem concerns how elected officials can grant authority to
others to develop and implement policy without losing influence over its
content.2 Because the development of new policy requires time and expertise,
20. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 806-07.
21. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN
THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).
22. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 243-78 (1987); Gary Miller & Terry Moe, The Positive Theory of Hierarchies,
in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS (Herbert Weisberg ed., 1986); ; Terry M. Moe, The
Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? (John E. Chubb & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1989); Pablo Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals
Agency Theory of Regulation (or "Let Them Be Bribed"), 33 J.L. & ECON. 65 (1990); Kathleen Bawn,
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Congress delegates this responsibility to committees in the House and Senate,
and also to their staffP or to the executive branch. Individual legislators tend
to specialize in a few policy areas, relying on other specialists to develop other
policies. Once a legislative bargain has been struck, legislators must delegate the
authority to implement policies to executive branch officials. The problem
legislators face is how to delegate authority without losing control of policy.
Legislation plays an important role in solving both problems. With respect
to the collective action problem, statutes define and record the details of the
bargain reached among majorities in the House and Senate, as well as, most
often, the president. In this sense, legislation is the embodiment of collective
action. Moreover, the rules and structure of the legislative process lend
durability to an otherwise unstable collective action, because they endow
authority to specific legislators whose interests (presumably) are well-known and
stable. The legislature can choose a degree of difficulty for changing a policy
bargain through its choice of institutional rules and structures. For example,
attempts to pass new legislation typically must navigate through numerous veto
gates before even reaching the presidential approval/veto stage: agreement must
be reached among House and Senate committees, the majority party leadership
in both chambers, majorities in both chambers, and the president.24 Conse-
quently, it is difficult and time-consuming to change most prior legislative
bargains.
Political Control vs. Expertise: Explaining Differences in Administrative Arrangements (1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with UCLA Department of Political Science); Pablo Spiller & Santiago
Urbiztando, Interest Groups and Control of the Bureaucracy (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with University of Illinois Department of Economics).
23. Legal scholars have questioned the idea that statutes and committee reports represent an
agreement among lawmakers on the grounds that both are written in significant measure by staff or even
lobbyists and that, in any case, only committee members are likely to pay much attention to the drafting
of either. For example, then-Judge Scalia, based on the observation that most legislators do not read
committee reports, concluded that "routine deference to the detail of committee reports [is] ...
converting a system of judicial construction into a system of committee-staff prescription." Hirschey v.
F.E.R.C. 777 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concurring opinion). Easterbrook's argument for strict
textualism and narrow construction is based in part on these observations. Easterbrook, supra note 3.
But this view is simply one version of the more general delegation problem, and it does not take into
account the lessons of principal-agent theory. The observation that committees and their staffs do most
of the legislative work and that the floor majority rarely inspects all of their efforts implies nothing about
whether the floor majority has abdicated its formal role. If the floor has created effective incentives for
its committees and staff in its structure and process, it need not constantly monitor their work product
to assure compliance with the interests of the floor majority. Again, the contracting analogy is useful.
One cannot argue that a contract between two parties does not embody their mutual agreement because
both parties delegated the negotiation to their lawyers and then signed it after only superficial perusal
of its contents. Presumably clients delegate the job of negotiating contracts to their lawyers because they
can rely on the incentive structure of the attorney-client relationship. This reliance enables them to
obtain the expertise of a lawyer without fearing that their interests will be ignored in drafting an
agreement. The same logic applies to decisions by a legislature on its structure and process.
24. Thomas H. Hammond & Gary J. Miller, The Core of the Constitution, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv.
1155 (1987); Kenneth Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting
Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979); Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, Structure-Induced
Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHoIcE 503 (1981).
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With respect to the delegation problem, statutes are also instructions to
bureaucrats concerning policy. The language of a statute can be regarded as a
statement of the preferences of a fictitious decisionmaker who embodies the
compromises that solved the collective action problem. If the coalition has
agreed to a system of rewards and punishments to induce the bureaucracy to
carry out its legislative agreement, the statute constitutes a statement to the
bureaucracy of the criteria that will be used to implement these incentives.
Statutes also contain agreements about organizational structure and
decisionmaking procedures for the implementing bureaucracy.' Structure and
process affect agency decisions by controlling the actions that the agency may
consider, the information that the agency may use to make decisions, the extent
to which the agency must announce its intentions (and hence warn of potential
noncompliance with the coalitional agreement embodied in the statute), and the
extent to which agency decisions are subject to appeal. 26 Thus, the structure
and process of an agency are determined through a legislative bargain about the
interests that the agency is supposed to serve, and consequently are a part of the
policy agreement.27 These rules and procedures tend to have a stabilizing effect
on policy implementation for two reasons. First, much of the bureaucracy is
composed of career civil servants. Legislators thus can collect a wealth of
information about the behavior of these bureaucrats under different circumstanc-
es, and thereby make credible inferences about their private motivations and
interests, which they can then incorporate into the rules and procedures they use
to shape the implementation of a new policy. Second, by varying the incentives
offered to bureaucrats, legislators can also induce some individual types to select
out of and others to select into bureaucratic careers. Hence, legislative design
may actually contribute to the stocking of the executive branch career service
with "Burkean" public servants.
B. The Stake of Lawmakers in Interpretive Method
For statutes to serve their function as instructions to agencies and courts,
legislation must be regarded by relevant political actors as a reasonably reliable
determinant of policy outcomes. In the first instance, the members of the
enacting coalition must have confidence that, although they have different policy
preferences, the statute constitutes a mutual agreement over policy that improves
upon existing policy. Otherwise, statutes cannot reliably serve the purpose of
embodying their solution to the collective action problem. Bureaucrats must also
have confidence that they can understand the statute. Otherwise, they cannot
25. McCubbins et al., supra note 16.
26. SHAPIRO, supra note 12; see also ARTHUR BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1989); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
27. McCubbins et al., supra note 16.
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respond rationally to rewards and punishments that the enacting coalition has
adopted to induce compliance with its agreement. 28
Reliability in interpreting the meaning of a statute is inherently difficult to
assure. Unfortunately, only rarely can statutory language be precise in conveying
either policy bargains or instructions to agencies. Nature has a nasty habit of
creating situations in which the applicability of a statute is unclear. But even if
nature were not unkind, the meaning of statutes would still be problematic
because language is inherently imprecise and because rational political actors,
having numerous competing ways to occupy their time, would never devote the
effort necessary to minimize the indeterminacy of statutory language.
Consequently, a set of coherent, commonly understood principles for ascertaining
the intended meaning of unclear statutory provisions is valuable to legislators
because it reduces the uncertainty surrounding the policy consequences of a
statute and, thereby, increases the ability of legislators to achieve their policy
objectives.
In writing a statute, those who have been given the job of striking a bargain
among the coalition members can be regarded as facing a form of constrained
optimization problem. The enacting coalition and the staff who work for its
members allocate a valuable resource-their time and effort-to activities leading
to a new statutory policy. One such activity is negotiating what the policy will
be, which requires compromising their differences. Another is writing statutory
language for each provision in the statute, including the provisions governing the
structure and process of the implementing bureaucracy and the nature of judicial
review of the agency's decisions. Still another action available to them is to
agree to language that will instruct agencies and courts on how to interpret
ambiguous or contradictory provisions in the statute.29  Finally, given the
principles of interpretation that the coalition adopts or that its members
anticipate the courts will use, members of the coalition can undertake strategic
activities to influence the interpretation that agencies and courts in fact adopt,
such as issuing reports and making statements on the floor to elaborate the
meaning of a bill.3"
28. This argument is not inconsistent with the view that in some cases a legislative coalition will not
resolve its policy differences, but instead will enact a "policy lottery" through a vague statute, thereby
"shifting the blame" for a potentially controversial outcome on the implementing agency or the courts.
See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, Group Concentration and Delegation of Legislative Authority, in
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985). In this case, the legislative
history is properly interpreted as, first, delegating broad authority, but second, either by direct statement
or inferentially through the choice of structure and process, setting boundaries on the acceptable policy
outcomes. At this point, judges and legal scholars can debate whether the court should declare the
statute invalid, should defer to the agency's decision about where within the boundaries to select a policy,
or should make use of some normative principles to narrow still further the range of acceptable agency
decisions. Our interpretive program is useful in all of these cases, because it enables outside observers
to determine whether the statute is vague, whether its vagueness is intentional, and what boundaries on
policymaking by an agency it contains.
29. For examples, see Rodriguez, supra note 9.
30. We do not mean to imply that strategic behavior necessarily involves legislators misrepresenting
their preferences over policy outcomes. By strategic behavior we merely mean that legislators attempt
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The solution to this optimization problem is unlikely to be either a statute
that is worded with perfect clarity or one that is written relatively vaguely but
with a crystal clear method of interpretation. Thus, another parallel can be
drawn between the legislative process and the negotiation of private contracts.
In neither case will the parties to an agreement find it worthwhile to antici-
pate-and guard against-every conceivable eventuality in reaching a written
agreement. Indeed, in both cases the principles of interpretation adopted by the
courts will affect the effort devoted to details in the written agreement.
If the parties to an agreement regard the interpretive methods of the court
as likely to produce a result that reflects the compromises struck in the original
agreement, they need not devote as much effort to fashioning the bargain.
Moreover, in areas where the facts are uncertain and knowledge is expanding
rapidly, but where legislators know the general direction that they want policy
to take, they can fashion imprecise legislation that enables bureaucrats and courts
to develop suitable policies as the facts unfurl. Without an interpretive method
that is faithful to their intentions, on the other hand, effective legislation would
be too risky or perhaps even impossible to craft.
Finally, an interpretive method that is faithful to the legislative agreement
means that legislators need not frequently revisit their bargain to redefine it in
light of new circumstance. Because legislatures are composed of many members,
representing numerous competing interests, rather than the bilateral negotiation
reflected in most contracts, frequent renegotiations are likely to be costly and,
due to the collective action problem, to have highly uncertain outcomes. Hence,
parties to a legislative bargain will place a high value on expansive interpretive
principles that reasonably reflect the spirit of the initial agreement. Indeed, the
value of expansive readings will be greater for legislation than for contracts.
Interpretive principles, then, are bound to be an integral part of the
coalition's agreement about a statute, either explicitly in statutes or implicitly
through reliance on continued application of interpretive principles propounded
by the courts. Explicit and implicit understandings about interpretive principles
are necessary for forming expectations about the effect of statutory language on
policy outcomes and the durability of legislative agreements, and for rationally
allocating effort in the legislative process. From these insights, one can readily
identify several aspects of interpretive methods that members of the enacting
coalition will regard as important.
Obviously, legislators will want the foundation of an interpretive principle to
be the faithful execution of their agreement. Because no interpretive method is
likely to be perfect in reproducing this agreement, and because both legislators
and citizens are likely to prefer that policies be stable through time and changed
significantly only by new legislation, legislators will also want judicial interpreta-
to forecast how other actors involved in developing a policy will react to alternative institutional
structures and take actions that maximize the chance that the new policy will advance their political
objectives. For legislators acting as agents for the majority coalition, this objective can be to maximize
the probability that the coalition's agreement will actually be implemented by agencies and courts.
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tions of statutes to be consistent across cases. If legislators can rely on the
stability of the interpretations adopted by the courts, they can anticipate areas
where interpretive problems are most likely to arise and focus their efforts for
legislative clarification on them. If judicial decisions are inconsistent, their only
recourse is greater specificity in both the substance of and statutory guidance
about interpretation for all legislation. And, if legislative history contains a
cacophony of mutually contradictory indicators of statutory meaning, a set of
interpretive principles that does not have a coherent, consistent method for
separating the meaningful indicators of intent from inconsequential actions will
inevitably lead to inconsistent interpretations.
The conclusion that lawmakers prefer stable, predictable, interpretive
principles that are faithful to their agreements does not necessarily mean that
agencies and the court will adopt such principles. We will not systematically
address this issue here, except to make two observations. First, because stable,
predictable, and faithful methods are a necessary component of any interpretive
system that is grounded in legislative intent, one who believes that the intended
meanings of statutes are normatively compelling policy directives will seek to
adopt methods that serve the purposes described here. Second, PPT provides
reason to believe that bureaucrats and judges will find value in stable and
predictable methods of interpretation that accord significant weight to legislative
intent. Although on any given issue decisionmakers may want to ignore statutes
and adopt their own preferred policy, they also must recognize that other actors
have the power to influence policy and that the process of policymaking is an
infinitely repeated game. Hence, if these actors are risk averse they, too, will
prefer general decisionmaking principles that avoid chaos and uncertainty, and
that reach policy accommodation with other actors, including lawmakers.
Whereas the desire for stability and accommodation does not lead to policy
implementation that is as faithful as possible to legislative intent, it does lead to
policies that take legislative intent seriously into account.31
On the basis of the arguments presented in this section, we conclude that
legislative intent is an important element of any normatively compelling
interpretive method and, more importantly, any interpretive system that real-
world lawmakers, judges, and civil servants are likely to adopt. Consequently,
developing more reliable methods of ascertaining legislative intent has practical
as well as theoretical value. Although the literature on statutory interpretation
31. As an illustration, the recent literature in PPT that deals with policy implementation by agencies
and courts defines the domain of bureaucratic and judicial discretion in terms of the policy preferences
of the president and the median voter in the legislature. See, e.g., the discussion of irreversible policy
deviations in McCubbins et al., supra note 16; the theory of judicial discretion developed in Pablo Spiller
& Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme
Court Labor Decisions, 1949-1987 (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Illinois);
the view of strategic statutory interpretation put forth in Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11. Because
these policy preferences are not published in the Congressional Record, civil servants or judges who wish
to behave in the manner described in these theories need a reliable method of estimating the intent of
a statute in order to ascertain the optimal irreversible act of noncompliance with this agreement.
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has identified the problems in reliably uncovering legislative intent and contains
many useful insights about how to do so, it has not advanced very far in linking
interpretive methodology to the complete extant theory of legislative enactment.
III
THE THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE DECISIONMAKING
In order to ascertain the intent of a statute, an outsider to the legislative
process must be able to determine whose interests were influential in developing
the legislative agreement and what bargain was struck.32 All bills are bargains
among the members of some winning coalition, but the details of a bargain
depend critically on the route a bill takes through the decisionmaking structure
of Congress. By understanding the legislative path of a bill-including who the
decisionmakers were at key stages in the legislative process and what demands
they made on the bill-an outside observer can begin to identify the elements
of the agreement that the coalition thought it was making that are not explicit
in the language of the statute. Because the coalition's agreements represent a
compromise among its members, the ascertainment of an implied agreement rests
on understanding what interests were compromised.
Two puzzles must be solved in order to create interpretive canons that are
consistent with and faithful to legislative bargains. The first is how to identify
the members of the enacting coalition, among whom the bargain was struck and
whose preferences most affected the dimensions of the bargain. The second is
how to identify the preferences of the coalition members.
A. Identifying the Enacting Coalition: Veto Gates and Pivotal Players
In the United States, more so than in most other democracies, majority rule
is tempered by granting minorities both limited veto power over changes in
existing policy and, often, control over proposals to change existing policy. The
basic structure of government establishes several checks on the ability of
legislative majorities to enact their will: Congress is divided into two chambers
and acts of Congress must be approved by the president (or failing that, must be
32. Skeptics about the value of making legislation easier for elected politicians do not find this
argument for "deep" readings of statutes to be normatively compelling. We do not wish to engage this
normative argument here, for our purpose is simply to make two important points: (1) The interpretive
canons used by a court will affect the amount and scope of legislation because they affect the effort
required for legislating and the certainty of the policy consequences of legislation; and (2) as a matter
of positive theory, legislators of the majority party will prefer interpretive methods that attempt faithfully
to implement the policy agreement that the enacting coalition thought it was legislating. Because of the
second point, attempts by a court to impose interpretive canons that do not serve the purposes of
consistency and faithfulness to the policy agreement are likely to cause legislative reactions, in the form
of either directions in statutes about how they are to be interpreted or reprisals against the court with
respect to its jurisdiction and resources. Hence, as a practical matter the normative argument about the
merits of alternative interpretive principles may be unimportant because legislators will take actions to
assure that the interpretive principles they prefer are adopted.
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approved by two-thirds majorities in both houses, thus enfranchising certain
members excluded from the original congressional majority). The legislative
process established by the Constitution has two especially noteworthy character-
istics. First, agenda control---control over proposals to change existing policy-is
conferred on Congress and is exercised according to the rules and structures that
govern congressional decisionmaking. Further, this agenda power is divided
between the House and Senate.
Second, ualess a veto can be overridden, the president must be a partner in
every legislative bargain. This latter point commonly escapes the courts, for
virtually all of the evidence cited in court decisions regarding "legislative intent"
focuses on congressional activities.33 An examination of the president's role in
the legislative process leads inexorably to the conclusion that the president is a
member of most enacting coalitions.'
Unless Congress is sufficiently united to override a presidential veto, the
threat of veto constitutes an important check on the content of legislation. The
threat of a veto induces members of Congress to take presidential preferences
into consideration when writing legislation. For example, a president who
prefers lower spending on a program than does the majority party in Congress
may be able to force Congress to reduce its spending proposal downwards by
threatening to veto higher expenditures.35
Two conclusions follow from an analysis of the veto power in situations
where a congressional override is impossible: First, we can infer that the
president prefers the legislation (and the intentions of the legislation) to the
policies that would obtain if the bill were vetoed. Second, we can infer that
Congress has accommodated any misgivings of the president about particular
portions of the bill by either striking a compromise with the president over those
provisions or repackaging the bill so that the president obtains another policy
objective elsewhere in the bill in return for accepting some otherwise unpalatable
provision.
Congress's legislative record on a policy decision will include the president's
views and preferences, sometimes directly, but most often indirectly through the
kinds of amendments that are attached to a particular bill or the provisions that
are removed prior to final approval in Congress. In either case, the bill contains
language somewhere that reflects the president's policy preferences.
Although the threat of veto confers power on the president in shaping
legislation, the fact that the president approves a bill at the final stage does little
to clarify what the bill means. At this stage, because the statute is presented to
the president as a take-it-or-leave-it package, the president's signing of the bill
33. See Rodriguez, supra note 9.
34. For models of the president's veto power, see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11; William
Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Courts/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L.
REv. 613 (1991); D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional
Appropriations, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 714 (1988).
35. Kiewiet & McCubbins, supra note 34.
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only implies that the president prefers the entire package to the policy that
would emerge if the bill were vetoed. Because the construction of the legislative
package takes place earlier in the process, all presidential actions that could have
influenced the content of the legislation have already taken place by the time the
bill is signed.
The House and Senate also have vetoes over changes in existing policy.
Thus, whoever holds veto positions within the House and Senate can exercise
that chamber's veto power. Moreover, whoever controls the agenda for a
chamber will exercise that chamber's share of the agenda power. Thus, the rules
and structure of the House and Senate are important determinants of how
influence over policymaking is shaped and provides the key to understanding
who is influential, and for our purposes, whose preferences matter and whose do
not.
The single most important feature of the legislative process in the House and
Senate is that, to succeed, a bill must survive a gauntlet of veto gates in each
chamber, each of which is supervised by members chosen by their peers to
exercise gatekeeping authority. 6 In each chamber of Congress, at least one
subcommittee and one full committee have gatekeeping rights in that a bill
normally will not be considered by the entire legislative body until it has been
approved in committee. In some cases, several committees share responsibility.
The majority party leadership must then assent to a bill's consideration on the
floor. In the House, floor debate usually takes place under a special rule
restricting debate and amendments as proposed by the Rules Committee, which
is controlled by the leadership of the majority party. Once the majority party
leadership allows the bill to reach the floor, legislation must be approved by
majorities in each house. Differences in the bill passed by the two houses must
then be resolved, usually by a conference committee composed of supporters of
the bill from each chamber. The final product is then sent to the president.
The extent to which a member of an enacting coalition can influence
legislation depends on three factors: (1) the member's power to control the
agenda of the legislature, such as by holding a gatekeeping position; (2) the
amount of information possessed by the member about proposed alternatives and
the preferences of others; and (3) the details of the differences in policy
objectives among members. Normally, some members of the committees in
which legislation originates are pivotal in shaping legislation. Committee chairs
are always pivotal because they control the agendas of their respective
committees. Many House and Senate committees are delegated considerable
latitude in legislating within their jurisdiction-or in deciding not to legislate, so
that committee members who take responsibility for writing a bill that is
reported out of committee are also pivotal. Similarly, majority party leaders are
often pivotal, in part because they can control the agenda of each house of
Congress (including the amendments that will be considered) and in part because
36. See discussion supra part I and note 14.
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their positions give them greater access to information about the distribution of
preferences in the legislature. Finally, when a bill reaches the floor, its sponsors
among the committee and party leadership must induce others to become
supporters. This leads to compromises whereby the preferences of moderates
determine the content of the final bill, not the position of the most ardent
supporters.
37
A clear grasp of the structure and process of legislative decisionmaking helps
clarify answers to several nagging questions broached by critics of an
intentionalist approach. Many have criticized intentionalism because legislatures
are a "they" not an "it."'  All 535 voting members have their own preferences
over policy and, hence, their own most preferred interpretation of any piece of
legislation. Moreover, as social choice theorists have known since Condorcet,
majority-rule decisionmaking in the absence of agenda control can be unstable.
But these observations do not imply that the concept of statutory intent lacks
content. In the first place, that legislators all have different intentions does not
imply that they do not or cannot strike bargains in order to construct a common
understanding of the intention of a particular statute. Returning to the contract
analogy, private agreements always involve at least two parties with conflicting
preferences, yet the concept of contractual intent is not regarded as problematic.
The number of legislators does not change the basic dynamic of policymaking:
in the United States, it is Congress as a whole that makes laws, not individual
members of Congress. The fact that a particular agreement about intention
might be defeated by another intention in a majority rule process with no agenda
control does not mean that an enacted bill lacks meaning, just as a collective
bargaining agreement does not lack meaning because a majority of union
members might vote for an alternative that was not presented to them. To deny
that a single, common intention for a statute is possible is to deny as well that
Congress can legislate or that private parties can contract, a claim that is patently
false.39
Critics of intentionalism also have argued that, although a common
understanding of intention may be possible, the members of an enacting coalition
show no evidence that they share a common understanding. Positive theory
offers insights into this criticism as well. Returning for a moment to the
contracting analogy, collective enterprises-such as corporations-are fully
capable of entering into contracts. When interpretive disputes arise between
37. The centralizing tendency in majority-rule processes is captured in the "median voter" theorem
for votes over one-dimensional policies (such as the appropriations for a program) and by the concept
of the "win set" in multidimensional policy votes. Previously, we have used both models to discuss
statutory interpretation. For a one-dimensional exposition, see McNollgast, supra note 10, and for two
dimensions, see McCubbins et al., supra note 16.
38. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not
an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 4.
39. Posner makes the same argument, stating: "Institutions act purposively, therefore they have
purposes. A document can manifest a single purpose even though those who drafted and approved it
had a variety of private motives and expectations." Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 196 (1986-87).
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corporate parties to a contract, the courts typically ascertain the agreement of the
parties by examining the statements of each party's chief negotiating officers,
regardless of what a particular shareholder or other employee might have
thought about the contract.40 Corporations employ agents to negotiate on their
behalf; analogously, legislatures employ agents at various points in the legislative
process, empowering those agents to act in the name of the collective.
Sometimes these agents are subsequently overruled, in which case the negation
of their actions provides informative signals about legislative intent. Conversely,
when they are not overruled, their statements and actions, made in their capacity
as agents of the collective, provide information about legislative intent.
Moreover, these statements are more informative than the statements and actions
of other legislators who were not delegated special responsibilities at these key
points in the legislative process.
The instability of social decisions in majority rule institutions has produced
another line of criticism.41  The most radical of these criticisms argues that
social decisions are "incoherent" or meaningless-devoid of any real measure of
social "preference" in the populist sense. In the first place, the instability results
indicate nothing of this sort.4' Rather, they illustrate that social choices need
not be transitive. This is far from saying that social choices will be chaotic. In
the second place, the structure and process of legislative decisionmaking, once
established, leads to policy choices that are structurally stable.43 Choices over
structure and process are neither random nor unstable, but are chosen by
members of the majority party in each legislative chamber to establish an order
of business that is regarded as desirable by a majority of legislators.'
The details of the rules and procedures under which a bill is considered
matter a great deal in determining whose preferences are influential in
policymaking. To see this, suppose that the House is considering legislation
under a closed rule, that is, no amendments to the committee's bill are allowed.
A closed rule gives great power to the members of the committee that brought
the bill to the floor. If the proposed rule blocks consideration of amendments
that would significantly change the committee's reported bill, other members
realize this and would be unlikely to vote for the rule unless they found the
committee's proposal not only acceptable but preferable to the outcome they
would expect from a less restricted agenda. If the committee's proposal is
40. We are indebted to William Eskridge for pointing out this analogy to us.
41. The most famous of these is KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(1963).
42. For generalizations and interpretations of the Arrovian social choice paradoxes, see THOMAS
SCHWARTZ, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE (1986).
43. Kenneth Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting
Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979). But see William Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of
Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432 (1980).
44. On the design of legislative structure, see GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES IN THE U.S. HOUSE (1992); Kiewiet &
McCubbins, supra note 34; Barry R. Weingast & William Marshall, The Industrial Organization of
Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988).
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considered under a rule that allows important amendments to be offered against
the committee's proposal, other members of Congress outside the originating
committee can be pivotal. The leadership of the majority party is likely to be
influential because, through the Rules Committee, it can decide which
amendments will be considered and the order in which they will be introduced.
Likewise, if an important amendment is adopted, the winning margin may be
supplied by members of the minority party, in which case those members can be
pivotal.
In general, two bills that follow precisely the same legislative path will not
be equally influenced by each member of the enacting coalition even if the
enacting coalitions are identical. One reason is that neither members'
preferences nor knowledge about the effects of a proposal will be distributed
identically for two pieces of legislation. Another reason is that within the
originating committee, different members will assume the role of gatekeeper by
taking the lead in writing and shepherding through the legislation. Still another
reason is that the centrists on the floor-the marginal members of the
coalition-will have different knowledge about different bills, and different stakes
in them. These differences will affect the extent to which they will force a bill's
more ardent sponsors to compromise.
While identifying the members of the enacting coalition and the weights
accorded their preferences in the bargain can be difficult ex post, identifying
members who were excluded from the enacting coalition is usually easy.
Members who voted against the legislation in key votes, who filed minority
reports against the legislation in committee, and who offered rejected amend-
ments to kill or gut the legislation should be regarded as outside the enacting
coalition, even if they voted in favor of the bill on final passage. Likewise,
pivotal members whose legislative language is subsequently altered can be
regarded as having a different intent from that of the enacting coalition which
eventually adopted the legislation. Their preferences should be accorded no
weight in any interpretive method, except that amendments rejected by the
enacting coalition yield further evidence about the dimensions of the bargain
struck among its supporters. A similar argument applies when the president
vetoes legislation and both houses vote to override the veto, or when key votes
are all so lopsided that a veto is likely to be overridden. In this case, the
president's preferences on the bill can be ignored.
B. The Economics of Signaling: Reading the Legislative History
Solving the puzzle of intention entails not just identifying the pivotal
members of the enacting coalition, but ascertaining their preferences and
agreements. The hazard associated with ascertaining preferences and agreements
is that the legislative process is rife with opportunities for strategic behavior. In
other words, members have many opportunities to misrepresent their own
interests and the intent of a bill. If one cannot distinguish between inaccurate
and truthful representations, knowing who was pivotal may not be useful in
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identifying legislative intent. This fact has been a major source of criticism of the
intentionalist approach. 5
One opportunity for strategic behavior on the part of legislators arises from
the collective action problem within Congress. Every stage in the legislative
process is susceptible to manipulation by strategic actors. For example,
amendments can be offered in committee or on the floor that are designed not
to change the proposed policy but to kill it. Hence, voting on amendments can
be strategic, intended to burden a bill with objectionable amendments so that
those who originally favored the bill end up rejecting the amended version.
Likewise, extreme statements concerning the intent of legislation can be inserted
into the record to move public opinion, to demonstrate fealty to a particular
interest, or to put pressure on other members to change their positions.
A second form of strategic behavior arises from the delegation problem. For
example, members of Congress and the president might look ahead to the
implementation of a statute and its interpretations by the courts. They may be
able to anticipate how agencies will choose actions and how courts will interpret
statutes in reviewing agency actions. The possibility of influencing these
subsequent decisions could lead members of Congress and the president to take
independent actions outside the confines of the enacting coalition's bargain. At
every stage in legislative bargaining, members of Congress and the president
have an incentive to try to twist subsequent interpretations of the bargain in their
favor through strategic behavior. Consequently, statements by the president,
lobbyists, or members of Congress, either in hearings, debates, or minority
reports, when made outside the context of an actor's formal role as a pivotal
player, do not represent the collective agreement and should be accorded no
weight in the interpretation of the statute.
So how can the legislative history of a statute reveal legislative intent? The
fundamental problem, of course, is that citizens, judges, and bureaucrats are
uncertain about legislative intent. There is nothing unique about this problem.
People frequently are uncertain about the consequences of the decisions they
make. Nonetheless, all but the most existentially paralyzed still make decisions
and take actions.
The economic theory of decisions under uncertainty begins with the
decisionmaker's beliefs about the likelihood of feasible outcomes: a set of
probabilities, summing to one, is assigned to the elements of a set of mutually
exclusive interpretations. In other words, the decisionmaker assigns weights
subjectively to each of the outcomes that could logically follow from a feasible
action. We expect people to make use of all of their experiences to make the
most "informed" choice. Thus, we expect a person to try to learn-to adjust
beliefs about a decision based on inferences drawn from new experiences. But
no matter how much experience an individual may have-including events
45. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4; Sunstein, supra note 4.
[Vol. 57: No. 1
POSMVE POLITICAL THEORY
observed and signals received from other people-some uncertainty about the
consequences of any action will remain.
A little statistical decision theory helps to clarify the general issue of the
value of new information. A judge may believe that any one of four mutually
exclusive interpretations-A, B, C, or D-of a clause in an act are plausible.
Based on Step One, a "plain meaning" reading, and Step TWo, a consideration
of the purpose and structure of the organic act,' the judge concludes that A is
the most plausible interpretation, but that the other three are not ruled out and
are all about equally likely. Writing the probability that an interpretation is
correct as P(i), where i = A, B, C, or D, these beliefs might be represented as
P(A) = .4, and P(B) = P(C) = P(D) = .2. For ease of analysis, assume that the
judge has no personal preference among these alternatives, and so cares only
about democratic legitimacy in picking among the alternatives.
If interpretive investigation ends at this point, the decision of the judge
depends on the normative context of the decision. The judge may believe that
the best interpretive principle is to maximize the probability that the legislative
intent is implemented, which implies picking A. However, this choice will, on
average, be incorrect sixty percent of the time. Alternatively, the judge might
believe in narrow textualism, and so refuse to apply the statute whenever the
intent of the enacting coalition is not stated in the text with sufficient clarity to
remove most uncertainty. This amounts to rejecting all statutes that are unclear,
in favor of another alternative, the status quo ante. Picking the status quo when
a legislative coalition has taken costly action to enact a statute-however vague
it may be-fails a very basic rationality test. Rational actors would not expend
effort and resources to enact vacuous legislation that does not affect the status
quo. Hence, the status quo is certain not to be the intent of the legislation.
Suppose that the judge proceeds to read the legislative history and finds that
at some point in the process all four interpretations were attributed to the
statute. This discovery might be helpful in structuring the judge's opinion, for
it would produce quotes and citations to buttress whatever choice was made.
But the judge would be no better informed about the actual agreement in the
statute. However, suppose that further examination reveals that A was inserted
in the record after the vote was taken as an extension of the remarks of a
legislator, B was stated as the explanation for a vote against the bill by one of
its opponents, C was inserted by a legislator as an explanation of why certain
constituents support it, and D was offered by the floor manager of the bill acting
as the agent of the House (for example, in response to a question about the
implications of some language in the report of the House-Senate Conference
Committee that produced the final version of the bill). For reasons discussed in
more detail below, the first three statements are all likely to be "cheap talk,"
strategic statements for which the legislators making them are not held
accountable, and thus are unlikely to be informative as to the true intent of the
46. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
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legislation. But D is consequential: the legislator making that statement did so
as an appointed agent of the legislative majority that passed the chamber's
version of the statute. A legislator acting as an agent for the majority can be
subject to sanctions and loss of reputation if this interpretation is not truthful.
Thus, our jurist would be driven to conclude that alternative D is now the
interpretation that is most likely to be correct.
The type of learning described above does not necessarily lead to a choice
that is certain to be correct, but in a probabilistic sense it never produces a worse
choice. Thus, the judge might conclude that the chance that a floor manager
answers a question correctly is only .9, based on past experience with reading
legislative histories. The statement of the floor manager raises the probability
that D is the true intent to .69. Applying Bayes Rule for updating probabilities
and assuming that all forms of cheap talk are equally unreliable and so
uninformative, after the statements have been observed, the chance that A is
correct has fallen to (roughly) fifteen percent: persisting in picking it (and
ignoring the legislative history) will be wrong eighty-five percent of the time.47
To change the example, suppose that both C and D are statements by a floor
manager, one in the House and one in the Senate, in response to the same
question. Still applying the rule of thumb that floor managers lie ten percent of
the time, four possibilities remain: (1) Both are prevaricating, with probability
.01 (the product of .1 and .1); (2) C is truthful and D is false, with probability .09
(the product of .1 and .9); (3) C is false and D is true, also with probability .09;
and (4) both managers are answering truthfully, but the enacting coalition had
an unresolved, unrecognized disagreement, which is the most likely case with
probability .81. In this case, persisting with A is clearly incorrect-applying
Bayes Rule the probability that it is the right interpretation is .011! C and D are
each likely to be correct with probability .492, so the judge is still more likely to
be wrong than to be right with either choice. Again, additional normative
principles may be invoked to favor one choice over another. For example, one
interpretation may amount to a private bill for a special interest, or one may be
more consistent with other law that the new statute was not enacted to repeal,
or one choice may be the decision of the implementing agency, which can be
accorded deference under broad delegation. Or the judge might conclude that
if no interpretation is more likely to be correct than incorrect, the statute should
be declared unenforceable because it is an unconstitutionally vague delegation.
Regardless of which normative principles are used at this last step in the process,
however, consulting the legislative history is a valuable activity as long as the
statute is not clear. Reviewing the legislative history can increase the chance that
the judge is basing an interpretation on the intent of the statute, and eliminate
some cases in which the judge regards no interpretation as very likely.
47. Bayes Rule provides:
P(event Idata) = P(data Ievent)P(event)
P(data Ievent)P(event) + P(data I not event)P(not event)
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The point of view expressed here is subtly at odds with a great deal of
literature on statutory interpretation.' 8 The fact that an intelligent, theoretically
grounded review of a legislative history does not necessarily reveal legislative
intent with perfect certainty is far from fatal to our argument. Theoretically
well-grounded interpretations of legislative signals will produce better informa-
tion than poorly grounded readings of the history or than a decision to ignore all
of the history because some of it is uninformative. Furthermore, decisions based
on better information can be no worse, and sometimes will be better, than
decisions based on worse information. In short, an interpretive method that
leads judges to pick D in the first example, or to invoke other criteria to select
between C and D in the second example, is preferable to a method that would
pick A in both instances.
The economics of signaling provides general lessons about how people learn
from observing the actions of others.49 We presume that members of the
enacting coalition are better informed about the intent of the legislative bargain
to which they are parties than are bureaucrats or jurists looking back at that
bargain. Thus, one precondition for learning is satisfied; if bureaucrats and
jurists can identify informative actions and messages coming from coalition
members, they can learn about legislative intent.
The economics of signaling also suggests that an action is informative if it is
taken by an informed person who pays a fee, expends effort, or foregoes some
valuable alternative activity in order to take the action. The logic of this lesson
is basically the old adage that "actions speak louder than words." Opportunity
costs cannot be recovered. Thus, in the legislative context, members of the
enacting coalition will not take actions that they believe will make them worse
off than doing nothing (after accounting for the cost of the actions themselves).
For example, legislators have many demands on their time, yet still participate
in debates in committee and on the floor, rather than (as the rules allow) mailing
in some well-chosen rhetoric after the die is cast. Why don't members simply
shut up and vote? One explanation is that much floor debate actually consists
of members expressing specific concerns about a bill, for which they demand
explanations from the floor manager. Judges can gain insight into the intent of
48. Notable exceptions are Shapiro and Posner. Shapiro, in favoring deference to agencies when
multiple interpretations are plausible, expresses hope that "the stubborn persistence of reality may block
the autonomous tendency of the law to pretend that statutes have far more fixed meanings than most
of them actually do." SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 172. Posner, in a far more reaching statement of
indeterminacy in legal analysis, adopts a position much like ours: "Legal reasoning is not a branch of
exact inquiry in an interesting sense, although continued progress in the economic analysis of the law
may compel a modification of this conclusion eventually." Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of
Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 858-59 (1988).
49. On the economics of signaling, see JEFFREY S. BANKS, SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, NEW YORK: HARDWOOD ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS (1991); Randall L. Calvert, The Value of
Biased Information. A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice, 47 J. POL. 530 (1985); Vincent P.
Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982); Arthur
Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda Control and the Power of Information, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390 (1992).
See also Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (Winter 1994).
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a bill from observing the questions asked of the floor manager by members who
ultimately support it.
Generally, an observer can learn from the actions of coalition members in the
sense that the observer knows that some actions will not be worth taking; the
greater the cost that an actor must bear to take an action, the greater the
expected benefit resulting from the action must be to justify it. Thus, the
observer can effectively exclude those states of the world where the observed
actions would have left the actor-the informed party-worse off than taking no
action.
How is it that judges or agency personnel can learn from costly actions and
accountable messages? Observing costly actions can help judges exclude some
alternative interpretations. For example, interpretations of a statute that were
rejected as amendments or alternatives to a bill cannot become part of a valid
interpretation of the statutory intent. By rejecting an alternative to the enacted
language, members of the enacting coalition take costly actions that inform
observers about the meaning of what is not rejected. To the extent that explicit
exclusions or rejections of alternatives are sustained at future stages, such costly
actions provide meaningful signals about what was not intended by the coalition.
That which is rejected is both the strict textual element of the bill, and an entire
family of extensions of the original bill that are dependent on some aspect of the
rejected alternative. Any action chosen by an agency (under the statute) in
response to some unanticipated contingency that implements or extends a
rejected alternative must itself be invalid.
Learning from legislative statements is similar. Whether a statement by a
legislator is subject to punishment if the statement is false or misleading depends
on the circumstances. For a legislature to work effectively, its members need to
be able to rely upon the truthfulness of some statements. The structure of
Congress-party organization and committees-reflects in part an attempt to
achieve efficiencies through delegation and specialization. In order for the
legislative system to work, members must be able to rely on a member acting as
an agent of the entire body.
The ability to rely on each other, given the diversity of interests among
political actors, cannot simply be assumed because it is collectively desirable, for
each member will experience circumstances in which personal benefits can be
derived from abrogating the norm of truthful revelation. To enforce this norm
requires that the legislative body have the will and means to punish members
who are not truthful when acting as agents for the entire body.
In practice, political actors have two routes to enforce truthfulness. First,
members who prevaricate can be and occasionally are removed from gatekeeping
positions, such as party leadership or committee chairs. Second, because
Congress passes a very large number of legislative provisions each year, the same
member is likely to be in a position of delegated authority on many occasions.
To succeed in accomplishing numerous legislative objectives over a lifetime in
politics, a legislator will find it valuable to develop a reputation for not taking
strategic advantage when acting as an agent for other members. Thus, a
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behavioral norm whereby legislators behave truthfully in their capacities as
representatives of a coalition, but strategically in their individual roles as
representatives of their constituencies, is self-enforcing.
By contrast, a behavioral norm that members behave truthfully and
nonstrategically when making an advocacy statement about a policy proposal is
not enforceable, in part because other legislators have no way of knowing a
legislator's true preferences. Moreover, because advocacy statements can be
aimed at constituents, contributors, and others outside the government,
legislators would not find it in their collective interests to devise a system of
rewards and punishments that demanded only truthful statements of personal
preference. Consequently, as Sunstein points out, much floor debate "reflects
little, if any general congressional will."50
These principles ensure that the findings, interpretations, and proposals of
agents of the majority, as reported to the House and Senate for review, are
meaningful signals about the legislative intent of the committee majority.
Statements by these members in their express capacity as agents of the ultimate
majority coalition for the bill on the floor are subject to penalties for lying. The
willingness of the floor to give members of a committee gatekeeping authority
over future bills as well as the committee's efforts in crafting a bill are at risk if
they misconstrue the meaning of the bill that they propose. Under the
reasonable assumption that maintaining a good reputation with one's peers is a
necessary condition for retaining a position of trust, a member has an incentive
not to misrepresent legislative bargains when acting in an official capacity as
agent for the majority.
Suppose, for example, that legislators who later vote in favor of a bill ask
specific questions of the floor manager. The floor manager is a member who has
been appointed by the majority coalition in the legislature as its agent. One
service that the agent is expected to provide is answering questions about the
scope and intent of the bill. Why should anyone believe the floor manager's
answers? The floor manager's institutional role creates an opportunity to behave
strategically-possibly, to tell lies. The economics of signaling suggest that the
answers are believable only to the extent that the floor manager faces penalties
for telling lies. If agents face penalties for lying, some lies will not be worth
telling (those lies for which the expected gain from lying is less than the penalty).
Moreover, if agencies and the court actually interpret laws in accordance with the
answers of floor managers, bills will not pass if a majority does not like the
answer; therefore, floor managers will take this anticipated response into
account when formulating their answers. As a result, an outside observer can
learn from the behavior of coalition members, in this case statements on the
record about the bill by members who have been appointed to fill important
institutional roles in the legislative process. This reasoning applies not only to
50. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 429.
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floor managers, but also to committee members who were responsible for writing
the committee report or the special rule under which the bill was considered.
These members can be held accountable by other coalition members for their
statements because they face penalties for lying.
When members of Congress or the president do not face disincentives to act
strategically, they probably will. Presidential signing statements, for example,
cannot be rejected or overturned by Congress, and are not negotiated with
members of the legislative coalition. Hence, the potential for unchecked
opportunistic behavior by the president is great. Presidents cannot easily be held
accountable for these statements by other coalition members. We therefore
expect presidents to act strategically in formulating signing statements. Our
theory of statutory interpretation concludes that observers will be unable to learn
what the president believes about the coalition's bargain from these statements.
Legislation proposed by the president also does not represent a negotiated
agreement. Hence, the president is free to behave strategically in making
proposals to Congress. Nevertheless, if Congress enacts language proposed by
the president, the courts should consider the president's explanations of the
proposal when it was submitted, for if Congress were not in agreement with
these statements, it could have amended the language or otherwise contradicted
this interpretation during its deliberations.
Likewise, members of Congress acting other than as designated agents of the
enacting coalition cannot be held accountable by the majority for their actions
and statements. Their incentives to act strategically will run unchecked, and,
again, our approach suggests that their statements should be discounted. Thus,
a statement by a member acting as an individual, and minority views and reports,
should carry no weight in statutory interpretation. Through PPT we learn that
talk is cheap. Only when the majority exerts effort to monitor and to constrain
talk should statements be considered relevant for statutory interpretation, and
then only to the extent that such talk is not directly contradicted by costly,
consequential action, that is, by voting behavior.
Professor Sunstein provides a marvelous example of congressional cheap talk,
quoting from the Congressional Record a statement made by Representative
Heckler:
Mr. Speaker, having received unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the
RECORD, I would like to indicate that I am not really speaking these words.
... As a matter of fact, I am back in my office typing this out on my own hot
little typewriter .... Such is the pretense of the House that it would have been
easy to just quietly include these remarks in the RECORD, issue a brave press
release, and convince thousands of cheering constituents that I was there fighting
every step of the way, influencing the course of history in the heat of debate.
5
51. Id. at 429 n.86.
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Representative Heckler, Justice Scalia, and Professor Sunstein thus have good
reason to ignore most of what is said in congressional debates. Our point is only
that not all talk is cheap and that, moreover, we know when it is not. To
illustrate this point, we examine the legislative histories of two statutes to
evaluate the validity of the way they were interpreted by the courts.
IV
INTERPRETATIONS OF NEPA AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
We have shown that PPT provides several important insights for distinguish-
ing relevant from irrelevant signals emanating from the legislative process.
Judges and other observers who seek to uncover the original intent of legislation
should focus their attention on the choices coalition members make and the
messages they compose when misrepresenting their intentions could be costly.
Other information is likely to be unreliable, and therefore should be discounted
heavily or ignored altogether.
This section applies the logic of our approach to a controversial court
decision from the 1970s: Judge Wright's 1971 opinion for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy
Commission,52 which clarified the applicability of the NEPA to the AEC. This
Section compares this decision to a roughly contemporary decision by Judge
Pratt in Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus,53 which required the EPA to apply the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") ambient air quality standard for
regulating pollution in pristine areas according to the Clean Air Act of 1970.
Both decisions, critics charge, pushed policy beyond the spirit of the bargain
struck by members of the enacting coalition. By reexamining these two
decisions, this section illustrates the practical utility of applying the positive
perspective on legislative bargaining that we have developed in this article.
A. Sierra Club
In a previous article' we provided the evidence from which we conclude
that in Sierra Club, Judge Pratt interpreted the Clean Air Act of 1970 (the
"Act") incorrectly because he relied on material in the legislative history that did
not reflect the agreement of the enacting coalition.55 The issue in the Sierra
case was whether state implementation plans under the Act must include
provisions to protect clean air areas from significant deterioration.56 Briefly, the
52. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
53. 334 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
54. McNollgast, supra note 13.
55. See generally Spiller, supra note 22; Brian Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on
Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Hoover Institution Working Paper in Political Science P-88-7); Spiller & Gely, supra note 31.
56. The court found that the 1970 Act did require that SIPS provide for prevention of significant
deterioration or "degradation." Judge Pratt's decision was based on a claim that PSD was "already
established" as a policy prior to the 1970 Act and that the new act's stated goal was to enhance and
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ambiguity in the Act arose because of an apparent contradiction in two
provisions. The preface of the Act was unqualified, stating that the purpose of
the Act was to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources. 's7
However, subsequent sections of the Act only authorized the EPA to set ambient
air quality standards that were "requisite to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air
pollution in the ambient air." 8 More stringent standards, if any, could only be
set by the states. The Act went on to require relatively stringent emissions
standards for new stationary sources in pristine areas, but nowhere did it state
explicitly that the ambient air quality standard in these areas was to be the
current state of air quality, even if some degradation were possible without
producing adverse effects.59
improve air quality. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR Acr 77 (1983). His claim that PSD was existing policy was based on five pieces of evidence, which
according to Melnick were:
1. A 1969 National Air Pollution Control Administration ("NAPCA") guideline announcing that
state air quality standards that "result in significant deterioration of air quality" conflict with the "protect
and enhance" goal of the 1967 Clean Air Act.
This is an example of costly but irrelevant action. The Statement is about the 1967 Act, not the
1970 Act. The 1967 Act did not give the federal government authority to set either primary or secondary
national ambient air quality standards, or new source performance standards. Hence the statement of
"policy" was largely without teeth, according to Melnick.
2. A 1970 statement by HEW officials that Nixon Administration proposals to amend the 1967 Act
were consistent with the NAPCA guideline.
This qualifies as cheap talk because statements about the effect of a legislative proposal by
executive branch officials are not credible if those officials cannot be held accountable for their
statements of opinion. The NAPCA guideline, as noted above, carried no sanctions to enforce "policy."
Hence, it was only advisory. Hence, the cited statement by HEW officials need only imply that they
agreed that "dirtying clean air baaaad. wouldn't be prudent. not gonna do it."
3. A 1970 Senate report stating that the EPA should reject SIPS that don't provide "to the
maximum extent practicable, for the continued maintenance of [pristine air areas'] ambient air quality."
This reasoning constitutes costly action, but blatantly misread by Judge Pratt. As we argued in
our previous work, Judge Pratt did not cite the full passage, which goes on to state that "deterioration
of air quality should not be permitted except under circumstances where there is no available
alternative." Clearly, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee anticipated that there would
be circumstances in which significant deterioration of pristine air areas would be justifiable, and specified
what to do in those circumstances.
4. An EPA proposed guideline from 1971 (later withdrawn) that national air quality standards
"shall not be considered in any manner to allow significant deterioration of existing air quality in any
portion of any state."
This constitutes costly action by EPA both in terms of proposing such a standard and in the fact
that it was withdrawn. We can make inferences from what proposals are rejected about how to interpret
what is accepted. Again, the withdrawl of this passage, like the Senate report discussed in point 3 above,
suggests that actors involved in composing and implementing the Act believed the Act did not require
PSD, but rather permitted pristine areas to be degraded under some circumstances.
5. Statements by committee members in oversight hearings in 1972 linking the "protect and
enhance" language of the 1970 Act to "PSD."
This is blatant cheap talk: No member can be held accountable by peers for policy statements
made during oversight hearings, becausee no votes are taken and no common positions are determined.
Id. at 77-78.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1988).
58. MELNICK, supra note 56, at 78-79.
59. For a full discussion of these issues, see MELNICK, supra note 56. On this general problem, see
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR (1981); E. Donald Elliot et
POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY
In deciding Sierra Club, Judge Pratt concluded that the general statement of
purpose in the preface overrode the implied qualifications in subsequent sections.
This interpretation ignored the process by which a legislative majority was
created to pass the bill. Whereas ardent supporters of tough environmental laws
drafted the initial legislation, including the unqualified preface, numerous
compromises were required in specific sections of the bill to obtain the support
of a legislative majority. One group that eventually joined the enacting coalition
was composed of legislators from undeveloped pristine regions. These
representatives wanted the Act to be sufficiently flexible that it would permit
economic growth in these areas. While they were willing to accept demanding
emissions standards for new sources-the "best available control technolo-
gy"-they were not willing to accept the requirement that air quality not be
permitted the slightest bit of degradation. By insisting upon the PSD standard,
Judge Pratt failed to honor the preferences of pivotal members of the enacting
coalition, and thereby overturned their legislative agreement.
Significantly, the problem in Sierra Club could not be solved by reference to
a "plain meaning" or "narrow construction" interpretive principle. The statute
is quite clear in stating that air quality is to be regulated by the EPA throughout
the country, so pristine areas could not be construed as being exempt. The
problem results from a contradiction in the quite clear meanings of two sections
of the same act. One has to choose between these sections, and PPT provides
direction as to which one ought to have precedence if the point is to enforce the
law as Congress intended. Judge Pratt wrote a new statute by ruling that the
unqualified preface trumped the qualifications in subsequent sections.
B. Calvert Cliffs
The Calvert Cliffs case illustrates more clearly how judges can use the
positive theory of the legislative process to uncover the intentions of a statute's
enacting coalition. NEPA imposed a duty on all federal agencies and depart-
ments to establish procedures through which environmental issues could be
raised and considered whenever an agency seeks to take a significant action or
make a recommendation to Congress. In Calvert Cliffs, the D.C. Court of
Appeals was asked to evaluate rules promulgated by the AEC to implement
NEPA. While the language in the Act clearly provided that NEPA applied to
all federal entities, it was less clear as to how the Act was to be implemented.
One area of ambiguity was the effect of the Act on ongoing regulatory activities
and licensing procedures that were being conducted in discrete stages, such as the
process for granting construction permits and operating licenses for nuclear
power plants.
Judge Wright made four primary findings in his decision, all of which
concerned the degree of discretion available to the AEC in the form and timing
al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
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of its implementation of NEPA. 6 First, Wright found that NEPA imposed a
60. The court addressed four specific questions regarding the AEC's implementation of NEPA:
1. The AEC under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 appoints a hearing board to review applications
for and make recommendations to the commission on operating licenses and construction permits for
nuclear power plants. Must the hearing board explicitly consider environmental issues in its hearing
process even if no environmental issues are raised before it by professional staff or outside parties?
The court held that the hearing board must explicitly consider environmental issues regardless
of what is or is not raised in the public hearing. In citing the evidence which supported the holding,
Judge Wright noted that in the Act Congress used two different standards for implementation of various
requirements-"fullest extent possible," in Sect. 102, and "all practicable means consistent with other
essential considerations," in Sect. 101(b). This costly action on the part of Congress suggests that the
procedural requirements of Sect. 102, including that the detailed statement of environmental impact
"accompany" a proposal throughout the regulatory process, means that the statement must be considered
"to the fullest extent possible" at every stage. Judge Wright further noted that House and Senate
conferees on NEPA had reported that the "fullest extent possible" language meant that "no agency shall
use an excessively narrow construction of its existing statutuory authorizations to avoid compliance" with
the goals of the act.
2. NEPA became law on January 1, 1970 but did not specify a timetable for implementation. AEC
issued a final rule implementing NEPA on December 3, 1970, which stipulated that nonradiological
environmental issues could not be raised in any hearing (construction permit or operating license) if
public notice of the hearing appeared in the Federal Register before March 4, 1971. Could the AEC
prohibit its hearing boards from considering nonradiological environmental issues in these cases?
The court held that agencies must seek means to comply with NEPA immediately. On-going
regulatory processes, such as licensing or permitting investigations that began before NEPA was enacted,
should be assessed to uncover what options are available to incorporate environmental concerns,
"balanced" against the costs of mid-course corrections. The earlier on a project is in a regulatory
process, the greater should be the scope of environment-protecting actions that might be justified in a
"balanced" review.
In support of its holding, the court noted that Congress has often specified implementation dates
or "grandfather" clauses when passing new regulatory legislation. They did not do so in this case, thus
the language of the statute permits no justification for delaying consideration of environmental issues.
The law sets a substantive standard requiring that environmental issues be protected by "all practicable
means consistent with other essential considerations" and that on environmental questions, alternative
courses of action be spelled out by the agency "to the fullest extent possible."
3. The AEC further prohibited its hearing boards from conducting independent investigations and
balancing evaluations of certain environmental issues for which other agencies have previously certified
that minimum statutory standards have been met by applicants. Could the AEC do this?
The court found that under NEPA, agencies are not limited by other agency's findings that a
project has met minimum statutory standards. The AEC can impose more stringent environmental
standards if warranted through an explicit "balancing" consideration; therefore, the AEC must
demonstrate that it considered the possible effects of more stringent environmental standards.
According to Judge Wright, the "plain language of Section 104 of NEPA and [the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970]" makes clear that agencies are not limited in their implementation of NEPA
by other agency's findings. The judge cited statements made by Sen. Jackson during Senate debate over
the NEPA conference report (140, notes 35 and 37), where he clarified that NEPA would not relieve
agencies of implementing more stringent requirements established under other statutes (such as WQIA).
Jackson, as floor manager for NEPA, noted that Sect. 104 was added to reassure supporters of the
WQIA that NEPA would not undercut its requirements. Finally, Judge Wright also cited the
section-by-section analysis of NEPA submitted by conferees to the Senate, which said NEPA procedures
could not substitute for more restrictive procedures in other acts. The judge inferred that where other
procedures were less restrictive, NEPA could require greater environmental protections through a
balancing analysis.
4. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the AEC conducts two stages of review of nuclear
power plants-for construction permits and for operating licenses. Could the AEC refuse to consider
environmental factors or require modifications in proposed facilities in between these regulatory stages
if the construction permit was issued before NEPA?
The court found that "A full NEPA consideration of alterations in the original plan of a facility
... is both important and appropriate well before the operating license proceedings. It is not duplicative
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nondiscretionary duty on the AEC to consider environmental issues explicitly at
every regulatory step, even when no intervenor has raised any environmental
concerns.61 Second, he found that the AEC was required by NEPA to begin
considering environmental issues surrounding the construction and operation of
nuclear power plants as soon as possible, even if a plant had already received a
construction permit, as long as it had not yet received an operating license.62
Third, Wright declared that NEPA's sections 104 and 105 stipulations preserving
the environmental obligations imposed by other statutes were meant to create
minimum standards that the AEC must meet in its environmental reviews, rather
than limiting the agency's scope for regulatory action.' Fourth, the judge
found that NEPA required federal licensing authorities such as the AEC to
consider ordering backfitting modifications to facilities when the environmental
benefits outweighed the costs.'
In each case, Judge Wright's findings are supported by costly actions on the
part of members of the enacting coalition, although Wright also cites "cheap
talk" in some instances. First, the wording of section 102(2)(c), requiring that
agencies include a "detailed statement" of environmental impacts in their
administrative record for every significant agency action, arises from a
compromise within the Senate. The section, as first written and passed by the
Senate in S. 1075, had required agencies to make an environmental "finding" at
every stage. However, a dispute arose between Senator Jackson (D.-Wash),
primary author of S. 1075 in the Senate Interior Committee, and Senator Muskie
(D.-Maine) of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, over the
relationship between NEPA and pollution control requirements under the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970. That dispute was settled when the Senate
amended S. 1075, prior to appointing a conference committee, to replace the
"finding" requirement with the "detailed statement" requirement. The Senate
then instructed its conferees to preserve that language change to insure that
NEPA would not permit agencies to circumvent the legal requirements imposed
by the Water Quality Improvement Act or other acts with similar, specific
environmental standards.
[of what would be done in the operating license proceedings] if environmental issues were not considered
in granting the construction permit."
Judge Wright noted that the AEC's rules did require the composition of the "detailed
statement" in these cases. Judge Wright found that the rules prohibiting the AEC from requiring
midcourse corrections in light of the evidence produced by the "detailed statement" of environmental
impact were plainly contrary to NEPA's required "balancing." The judge found that the detailed
statement requirement is actually an "action-forcing" requirement. The judge cited the Council of
Environmental Quality guidelines of April 23, 1971 interpreting section 102(2)(c) as evidence. Those
guidelines "urge agencies to employ NEPA procedures to minimize environmental damage, even when
approval of particular projects was given before January 1, 1970." NEPA designated CEQ as the agency
responsible for composing guidelines for agency implementation of the Act.
61. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C.Cir.
1971).
62. Id. at 1128.
63. Id. at 1125.
64. Id. at 1128.
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The compromise clarified that agencies must meet minimum statutory
standards, but must also consider going beyond such minima. Hence, the
provision is nondiscretionary; there are no circumstances in which an agency can
decline to compose the "detailed statement" and consider its environmental
implications in agency decisionmaking. Every agency decision must show
evidence that the detailed statement was incorporated as part of the evidence
upon which the decision was made.
Second, NEPA set no specific deadline for when agencies must begin giving
full force to the Act's environmental requirements, but rather called for agencies
to consider environmental issues "to the fullest extent possible," beginning from
the Act's effective date, January 1, 1970. Judge Wright noted that the Act did
require agencies to notify the president by July 1, 1971, if there were any
insuperable statutory barriers to their implementing the Act's requirements.
Furthermore, the House conference committee report specifically states that an
agency, in reviewing its statutory authorities and reporting conflicts to the
president, "shall not construe its existing authority in an unduly narrow
manner."'65 Judge Wright read these statements to mean that the AEC was
obligated to begin immediately to consider environmental issues in all its
regulatory endeavors. Hence, even if a plant had already received regulatory
approval for construction or operation, the AEC was required to investigate
environmental concerns, develop alternative courses of action, and evaluate the
costs and benefits of alternatives. Because the stated purpose of the Act was to
protect environmental values in a cost-effective manner, this necessarily required
the AEC to consider requiring backfitting modifications to plants already
approved.
Judge Wright made numerous references to statements made by various
members of the enacting coalition in committee hearings and floor debates.
Some of these statements are unreliable indices of legislative intent. However,
in nearly every case, the "cheap talk" was also accompanied by reference to
costly actions. For example, Wright cites a colloquy between Senators Jackson
and Muskie discussing the intent of the compromise that led the Senate to
change the "finding" requirement of section 102(2)(c) to "detailed statement"
and to change section 104, and a later colloquy in which the two discussed the
same portions of the conference report on the bill.' At the same time, Wright
also cites the section-by-section analysis of NEPA, for which Jackson asked
unanimous consent to have included in the Congressional Record.67 Jackson,
who was appointed by the Senate to report on the conference committee's
proposals (itself a costly action), exposed his own reputation as a good agent for
the Senate by this action-subjecting himself to an expected cost for lying.
65. H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 10 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767,
2771.
66. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1125.
67. Id. at 1126.
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Furthermore, the Senate itself had repeatedly taken costly actions to clarify
the intent of the legislation, through consideration of the original bill, S. 1075,
later amendments to the bill, and instructions to its conferees. The colloquies
between Jackson and Muskie largely reflect the costly actions taken by members
of the enacting coalition in the Senate.
In another passage, Judge Wright cites statements made by Jackson during
committee hearings and later in floor debate that NEPA established certain
"action-forcing" procedures (such as those of section 102(2)(c)).' However,
these statements are also supported by language in the Senate Interior
Committee's report on S. 1075 that "stressed the importance of the 'action-
forcing' provisions which require full and rigorous consideration of environmen-
tal values ... ."69 Indeed, at nearly every turn, Judge Wright looks to costly
actions taken by House and Senate committees, chamber majorities, or House
and Senate conferees to support his interpretations of the Act.
By contrast, the AEC briefs, in arguing for a looser application of NEPA to
the agency, rely only on loose interpretations of "cheap talk," such as floor
debates. As Judge Wright notes, it is language that "all the members of both
houses of Congress must approve or disapprove" that is most meaningful in
discerning statutory intent. "The courts should not allow that language to be
significantly undercut. In cases such as this one, the most we should do to
interpret clear statutory wording is to see that the overriding purpose behind the
wording supports its plain meaning."7
Subsequent legislative action supports our conclusion that Judge Wright
correctly interpreted legislative intent, while Judge Pratt did not. In a prior
publication, we show that Congress's failure to repeal Sierra Club's requirement
of PSD was not for a lack of effort.71 In fact, measures were introduced to
overturn the PSD requirement in both 1976 and 1977. These measures had had
the support of President Nixon and the key decisionmakers in the Senate. In the
end, however, the gatekeepers in the House, who had wanted PSD all along but
had been forced to sacrifice it to craft a majority for the 1970 legislation, simply
would not give up the windfall that Judge Pratt had provided with the Sierra
Club decision.
This case illustrates an important principle of the positive theory of the
legislative process: The absence of an ex post reaction to a judicially imposed
policy does not imply that the judicial interpretation of the original legislation
was correct. Rather, it reflects the court's ability to replace the original intent
with one of its own under political circumstances in which elected officials cannot
reverse. The notion that Congress will correct an interpretive mistake by the
court is simply wrong.
68. Id. at 1125.
69. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1113, n.7 (1969).
70. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1125.
71. McCubbins et al., supra note 16.
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In the case of Calvert Cliffs, Congress appeared partially to reverse Judge
Wright's decision. Congress passed legislation amending the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, which permitted the AEC to issue temporary operating licenses for
certain nuclear power plants.72 This legislation, however, came about not
because Judge Wright's interpretation was incorrect, but because the AEC
responded to Judge Wright in a manner that Congress did not completely
anticipate. Judge Wright ordered the AEC to reconsider its procedures for
implementing NEPA. In response, the agency placed a moratorium on new
operating licenses.
While this action provided a transitory benefit to the ardent opponents of
nuclear power, it went beyond the objectives of the enacting coalition. The
purpose of NEPA was to incorporate environmental costs and benefits into the
decisions of federal agencies, not to stop all nuclear power or, more generally,
to cause government regulatory processes to grind to a halt. Members of the
House and Senate successfully negotiated a partial retrenchment of the AEC's
response to Calvert Cliffs by passing HR 14655."3
V
CONCLUSION
PPT can make a significant contribution to a positive and normative theory
of statutory interpretation. Positive theory focuses attention on several important
features of the legislative process. One is a sharper conceptualization of the
notion of "statutory intent," one which maintains that a statute records the
agreement of the enacting coalition with respect to the policy adopted. A statute
enables members of the enacting coalition to know more precisely the nature of
their agreement, and conveys instructions to agencies and courts.
Statutes are most assuredly not embodiments of the preferences of any
particular legislator, but a compromise among these preferences. The structure
and process of legislative enactment allocate influence to the relevant actors
(including the president), and sometimes accord greater weight to one over
another, depending on the specific circumstances surrounding the legislation.
Consequently, there does not exist a set of weights to be attached to the
preferences of members of the enacting coalition that applies in all cases. Nor
should equal weight be placed on elements of the legislative history, regardless
of how the legislation actually evolved.
Our purpose is to ground statutory interpretation in an accurate, descriptive
model of the legislative process. While some of this approach is new-most
notably, its language, methods, and mode of analysis-it is firmly rooted in the
traditions of statutory interpretation. As with Hart and Sacks, our view involves
72. Pub. L. No. 92-307, 86 Stat. 191, 191-92 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988)).
73. Id.
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the "attribution of purpose" to legislation.74 It also involves the "method of
imaginative reconstruction," in which, as Posner says, "the judge should put
himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would
have wanted the statute applied.""5 In both cases, our approach provides a
specific method for determining which among the many possible such purposes
is most relevant. Our approach is, moreover, conventional in the sense that if
judges adopt the set of canons rooted in coalitional politics, then legislators will
have the strongest incentive to speak in ways that accurately convey their
intentions. Our approach also recognizes that legislation is fundamentally and
unalterably ambiguous because, ex ante, legislators simply cannot imagine the
variety of settings in which the legislation will apply.
We began this article by highlighting two puzzles in statutory interpretation
that are raised by the application of PPT. The first puzzle pertains to the
identification of whose policy preferences influence a legislative outcome. Any
member of Congress is potentially important to understanding the meaning of
a statute. Whose voices should judges and bureaucrats consider important and
whose actions should they consider relevant when trying to sort out a law's
intent? Indeed, who are the members of the enacting coalition? A necessary
condition for a legislator's preferences to be incorporated in the intent of
legislation is that the legislator voted in favor of the provision in question.
Opponents can reveal intent only indirectly, by offering alternatives that are
rejected. Some supporters of a provision will be more critical than others
because they control veto gates in the legislative process. Majority coalitions in
the two houses of Congress create and maintain rules and structures through
which these coalitions maintain themselves and their influence over legislative
outcomes. Thus, we can identify individuals whose opinions and actions carry
special weight in defining legislation.
The second puzzle concerns how to determine what members of the enacting
coalition wanted (and thought they were enacting) in a bill. The structure and
process (rules and procedures) of the two houses of Congress not only identify
individuals who matter, but also the critical moments in the legislative process
at which such individuals are empowered to act in the name of the ruling
coalition. Thus, we can identify the points in the process at which the actions
and statements of pivotal members are meaningful for interpreting a statute.
The economics of signaling inform us about the value of the actions and signals
we observe at these critical junctures. Interpretive methods that are based on
a better understanding of the costs lawmakers must bear and the penalties they
face for lying will produce better inferences about the informativeness of the
statements they offer and the choices they make.
74. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958), cited in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
75. Posner, supra note 5, at 817.
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